Playing the numbers on Iran

When George Bush started rattling sabers, nuclear sabers, at Iran a torrent of discussion was unleashed. For the most part it was not if, but when. After all, we had been conditioned to a reliably unimpressionable regime whose majority gave license to act at will.
Certainly they still have the majority, but with popularity dropping away as rapidly as midterm elections approach, the bravado is not so certain.
Yet it was this very point, the potential to firm up the numbers by a potentially ‘provoked’ action, which should have the effect of locking in the status quo. It is a risky tactic, not to mention bloody minded, but then we are talking about politics and politicians.
In the old days, before the Republican majority, there were well know strategies employed to gauge to viability, political viability, of proposed policies. One such maneuver was called, variously, balloon floating or running the flag up the pole.
The idea is simple enough, a statement of intent is made, usually by a minion, then reaction is monitored to determine the level of expected support, or otherwise.
Now I’m not sure that George was running the flag up the pole on this one, but I’m pretty sure it had the same inadvertent result.
Success is about timing and anticipation and he failed this one on both scores. On the international scene he had not anticipated his mainland European ally, Berlusconi, being dumped from office. The timing could not have been worse, especially as his other great European ally, Tony Blair, reacted badly to his friends defeat. True Blair has domestic issue to occupy him, but he manages them as well his allies, Bush and Australia’s Howard. Confronted with the Iran plan Blair did not so much refuse to engage as run a mile from the concept.
On the home front Bush and his team are facing an increasingly weary and wary electorate. For one thing, even for a fairly hawkish society, war is supposed to be short and sharp. Long drawn out engagements do nothing for government popularity and majorities can and do crumble.
In the end Bush must find himself isolated in his plan for an attack on Iran. He is isolated from his own domestic base and his once reliable foreign allies.
Surely, even without the comfort of allies and domestic numbers, Bush could still execute his inane plan. He still has the numbers, the time and dare I suggest the motivation. But will he?
If I were a betting man my wager would be on the whole idea being quietly forgotten. In fact I’m inclined to tg think that Bush’s administration and their close corporate friends will be far too busy manning the shredders to worry about Iran.